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Abstract. Heretofore the concept of “blockchain” has not been precisely
defined. Accordingly the potential useful applications of this technology
have been largely inflated. This work sidesteps the question of what
constitutes a blockchain as such and focuses on the architectural com-
ponents of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency, insofar as possible, in isolation.
We consider common problems inherent in the design of effective supply
chain management systems. With each identified problem we propose a
solution that utilizes one or more component aspects of Bitcoin. This cul-
minates in five design principles for increased efficiency in supply chain
management systems through the application of incentive mechanisms
and data structures native to the Bitcoin cryptocurrency protocol.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin is an emergent phenomenon realized through the subtle interaction of
multiple data structures and incentive mechanisms. In isolation the various com-
ponents of the Bitcoin technology ecosystem are well known and in some cases
have existed for years.
The novelty of Bitcoin was to combine these elements in a previously unimag-
ined way. The success of Bitcoin as a cryptocurrency has generated interest in the
underlying design principles of the cryptocurrency. This in turn has prompted
some to critically reassess traditional methods used to process information. The
purpose being to determine the extent to which architectural aspects of Bitcoin
might be leveraged to reduce or eliminate current inefficiencies.
One of the architectural components of Bitcoin is a modified linked list known
as a blockchain, demonstrated in Figure 1. At a fundamental level a blockchain
can be thought of as nothing more than a linear collection of data elements, i.e.
nodes (N1, ..., Nm). Each node, Ni, is pointed to by the subsequent node, Ni+1,
through a reference to its hash. Therefore Ni+1 maintains a hash of Ni. One of
the characteristics of this data representation format is that the integrity of the
complete list can be easily verified with relatively low storage requirements, in
fact by maintaining only the single hash at the head of the list. This construct,
introduced in 1990 by Haber & Stornetta [2], is integral to the Bitcoin spec-
ification. A blockchain can be used for verifiably representing and persistently
storing information related to supply chains in manufacturing. However as noted
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: (a) Diagrammatic depiction of a basic blockchain data structure. (b) Rep-
resentation of a simple transaction flow. The chain proceeds from node Ni (top
right) to node Nl (bottom left). Constituent blocks are indicated as bi. – Blue in-
dicates mutual agreement, sealed by proof-of-work (e.g. signature) and commit-
ted to the shared record. Nodes not directly connected expose no de-anonymizing
information.
earlier the innovation of Bitcoin is not due to any one element but rather to the
interplay of many technical and non-technical components. In this work we ex-
amine a subset of these components and detail a methodology for utilizing them
towards the creation of an efficient supply chain management system.
2 Related Work
The process by which data pertaining to particular parties is safely shared in
environments of low trust, such as exists between organizations cooperating in a
multi-node supply chain network can be problematic. Prior efforts to apply the
broadly defined concept of “blockchain” towards the creation of efficiency gains in
supply chain management systems have emphasized the use of distributed com-
puting environments. The scripting language of Bitcoin is limited in the sense
that it is not Turing complete. Various altcoin implementations have endeav-
ored to provide that functionality. The purpose of which being the fashioning of
a decentralized virtual machine. Such a system would constitute a distributed
app-engine capable of executing programs in a peer-to-peer network. In order to
operate effectively the system would seek to prevent the execution of programs
that could be detrimental to the network. The fundamental issue that opera-
tions of this nature are grappling with is the halting problem. Operators of such
platforms must answer the question of how to ensure that a program eventually
terminates and does not waste network resources. One workaround employed to
bypass this impediment has been to rent computation cycles for a fee [5].
To date there have been initial endeavors to apply such systems to the im-
provement of supply chain management information flows. The contributions of
these efforts to the creation of a viable solution have thus far been found want-
ing. Provenance1, one such attempt, states explicitly in the first paragraph of
their technical whitepaper “the decentralized application (Dapp) proposed in this
paper is still in development ”, and goes on to furnish no precise technical spec-
ifications. Skuchain2 likewise provides no technical information describing the
implementation of their proposed system. Distinct from these commercial op-
erations, the use of distributed app-engines towards the improvement of supply
chain data transmission has been examined in [3], which introduces an ontology-
driven model for tracing provenance of goods.
The relative immaturity of decentralized application systems, such as those
employed by the endeavors referenced above, presents a compelling reason to
exclude them from a studies such as those that deal with practical applications
realizable with current technology. In this work we dispense with the notion of
employing decentralized application systems. We examine exclusively the char-
acteristics inherent to the Bitcoin protocol at the current state of the art. This
paper is intended to provide concrete recommendations for the practical ame-
lioration of supply chain management systems that are realizable with modern
engineering and technological capabilities.
One of the most vulnerable attack vectors in Bitcoin protocol inspired supply
chain management systems is the mapping from the “real world” to the digital
world. The application of RFID to facilitate this inter-linkage as described by
[4] takes the approach followed here in its identification of tangible inefficiencies
and proposal for an actionable corrective measure.
3 Data-Structures & Design Principles
The exclusive attribution of effects from various properties native to the Bit-
coin cryptocurrency protocol is not straightforward as the validity of the system
emerges from a complex balance of forces. There exists a multi-faceted inter-
change of data representations and game theoretic incentive mechanisms that
give rise to the transaction network which supports Bitcoin. Accordingly this
section does not attempt to exhaustively enumerate the attributes of that pro-
tocol. What follows is a high level characterization of a subset of the properties
that are inherent to Bitcoin. Those properties are examined in light of their
potential utility to information retention and transmission contextualized in the
environment of a multi-party (inter-organizaional) supply chain. The selected as-
pects of the protocol are evaluated in order to provide a mapping between their
relevance to Bitcoin and their utility to a supply chain management system.
1 https://www.provenance.org/whitepaper
2 https://www.skuchain.com
3.1 Pseudo-Anonymity
Anonymity (and pseudo-anonymity) remains one of the fundamental tenants of
the “cypherpunk” movement that gave rise to the concept of cryptocurency. The
related property of fungability with respect to individual bitcoins is important to
the long-term viability of this technology as a medium of exchange. Association
with nefarious activity including coins that have been involved in deep-web drug
deals, such as those that regularly take place on AlphaBay Market, would po-
tentially subject those coins to censure by authorities, were they to be positively
identified. Such a result as that just described could diminish public confidence
in the currency and precipitate the ultimate dissolution of the transaction net-
work. What makes cryptocurrencies attractive to counterparties in these illicit
transactions is the relative size of the anonymity set associated with their use.
Network participants are represented only by their address, which if used in
accordance with best security practices can be difficult to associate with a real-
world identity. This serves to emphasize the point that pseudo-anonymity of
users is a characteristic regarded by some as indispensable to Bitcoin.
The practices employed by drug dealers of the 21st century, detailed above,
stand in stark contrast to the techniques employed by drug dealers of previous
eras, such as the 1980’s. The 2001 film Blow presents a portrayal of this reality
whilst simultaneously serving to illustrate an important aspect of supply chain
management. The scene wherein the American cocaine importer, George Jung,
introduces his Colombian connection to the head of his California distribution
network initiates a process by which George is subsequently extricated from
this commercial pipeline. This brief anecdote will underscore the importance of
anonymity amongst nodes in a supply chain. Inability to identify nodes to whom
one is not directly connected is a critical feature of a supply chain management
system, lest that information be used to “cut out” intermediary nodes. However,
representing nodes in a supply chain in such a way that we are able to trace the
goods they move through the network is important for preserving provenance
of entities exchanged. Strict prohibition on the de-anonymization of nodes with
whom one shares no common edge is simultaneously balanced with the need to
trace the provenance of interchanged information. There is an analogy in this
trade off to the operational characteristics of the Bitcoin protocol. Accordingly
the pseudo-anonymity properties of the Bitcoin network can be usefully employed
in the creation of a shared data structure amongst supply chain nodes with the
specified constraints.
Design Principle 1 Nodes must be represented by means of a persistent pseudony-
mous identifier through which it is possible to associate them with the information
exchanged (tx) at an approximate time (h). This representation should be resis-
tant to attempts at the association of such nodes with “real world” identifying
information.
Data Replication The use of data replication to prevent against the deteriora-
tion of information resources in systems requiring a high degree of fault tolerance
has been shown to be effective. This technique has been employed successfully in
the distributed processing of large data sets across clusters of computers, such as
Hadoop which utilizes redundant copies of information to prevent against unin-
tentional data corruption. Replication in computing involves sharing information
(distribution) so as to ensure consistency between redundant records. This pro-
cess often employs a rudimentary consensus mechanism to establish the canonical
source in the event of malfunction, explored later in more detail. The Bitcoin
protocol utilizes the concept of data replication in the historical transaction data
maintained by all full nodes on the network. There is a clear analogy here to the
individual cluster members in the Hadoop architecture, many of which maintain
a distinct copy of (often a subset over) the database. In the context of a supply
chain this feature would enable each node to independently verify their own copy
of the flow of goods or merchandise throughout the network.
Design Principle 2 Multiple copies of the shared database, including associ-
ated blocks and component transactions, should be maintained by actors operating
in the supply chain network exceeding a predetermined threshold.
Distributed Consensus The consensus model in it’s most elemental instanti-
ation would take the form of simple majority as in the case of Hadoop detailed
above. Mutual agreement between counter-parties provides another form of con-
sensus whereby the definitive characterization of an exchange can be recorded
after it’s having taken place3. Representation of individual nodes in the supply
chain by a unique digital signature provides a mechanism for the manufacturing
of trust. If two transacting nodes can consent to affix their personal signatures to
a transaction we can consider that this process has been successfully concluded.
Nodes have permission only to ascent to transactions in which they are directly
involved. This procedure is roughly sketched in Figure 1. Such a process tends
to result in a large common history. The signature take the place of “proof-of-
work” in the form of reputation staked on the veracity of their participation in
an atomic transaction. If an individual node were to itself become corrupt we
rely on the integrity of the remaining network participants that maintain a repli-
cated copy of that transaction. The quorum necessary to officiate a particular
interpretation can be based on simple majority of a fixed percentage (e.g. 3f +1))
to establish an implicit consensus on the canonical database representation.
This conception of consensus is dissimilar to the Bitcoin network where trust
is a function of the hashing power that a node is able to control. The threat
model herein considered differs markedly from that necessitated by the main-
tenance of a distributed cryptocurrency network since it is assumed that nodes
exchanging goods in a supply chain already foster a modicum of trust, i.e. a
working business relationship. This assumption permits of more flexibility in the
optimal behaviour policy we can expect from nodes.
Design Principle 3 Consensus is established by ascent of mutually transacting
nodes. These atomic instances are committed to a common shared history repli-
3 The case whereby parties cannot come to an agreement, treated in Section 4
cated throughout a subset of the network which serves as the future canonical
representation based on a predetermined consent parameter (network percent-
age).
Fig. 2: Data Provenance of Contaminated Units: As in Figure 1. blocks are de-
picted in blue, the connection between blocks (hash pointers) in red. Node Ni
is a supplier of raw materials. In two instances these have been contaminated
by the mismanagement of Nj. Contaminated units are green. The principle of
provenance enables latter nodes, including Nl & Nk, to trace the origin of the
contaminated goods back up the tree to identify their source.
Provenance of Data Theoretically to spend a Bitcoin requires that its prove-
nance be explicitly verified against the entire transaction history of the network
from the present epoch through to inception. This feature is beneficial to supply
chain systems concerned with targeted recall of defective products, especially so
since each individual Bitcoin exists as a unique unit within the closed system.
There is no individual actor with the capacity to Crtl + c, Ctrl + v a Bitcoin
into existence. Bitcoin units are recorded by the Unspent Transaction Output
(UTXO) set. The balance of any one wallet is the summation over the UTXO
instances assigned to the private key with which it is associated. Analogously an
automobile, or similarly a simple chair, is the summation over it’s constituent
(unique) parts.
Targeted recall of products effected by particular contagion is an important
concern to many organizations, for instance large automotive manufacturers. In
2015 the Volkswagen emissions scandal (VW-Abgasaffäre) prompted a vast re-
call campaign of large swaths of vehicles, likely including vehicles unaffected by
the defective component. The problem of tracking unique product constituents
through the inherent “mixing” process that goes on throughout a supply chain,
from material aggregation to finished product, can be conceived of as a task
related to that of tracking “tainted” coins through the Bitcoin network. This
traceability would allow manufacturers to implement targeted recalls with surgi-
cal precision, a substantial efficiency gain for supply chain management systems.
Design Principle 4 Representation of information interchange units should
be unique facilitating a navigable trail of provenance for individual components
throughout the shared database.
Proof-of-Work The Bitcoin proof-of-work exhausts computational power, and
ultimately electricity (among other considerations, i.e. the raw materials used
to fashion hardware) in the expending of scarce resources, viz. time and money,
in order to bring new Bitcoins into existence. Reputation and social capital are
likewise a scarce resource. Proof-of-work describes the procedure whereby nodes
exchange one resource to be remunerated in kind with another. For instance in
a supply chain management system nodes consent to the veracity of a trans-
action by affixing it with their digital signature, expending reputation, and are
remunerated with a certified representation of data they consider important.
Design Principle 5 Transaction quora can establish the degree to which they
are concerned with the integrity of some exchange unit by committing to the data
structure that represents it with a proof-of-work.
4 Threat Model
The Bitcoin protocol is optimized to combat problems inherent to the distributed
exchange of value in a peer-to-peer network such as double spending. In a supply
chain the idea of double spending is nonsensical. Nodes that maintain a working
business relationship preserve this arrangement by acting (in most cases) with
integrity. Thereby the proposed system is construed to utilize this degree of
mutual cooperation between transacting parties, for instance in the exchange
quora mechanism (Design Principle 5). This assumption obviates the need for
an external arbitrator under the belief that parties at loggerheads would be
unable to achieve mutual agreement.
The sale of counterfeit products is an issue that modern brands with multi-
national supply chain networks perpetually combat. Disingenuous goods cir-
culate widely on the deep web markets mentioned above. Initiatives such as
code.moncler.com by French luxury goods manufacturer Moncler attempts to
encourage users to register the QR code stitched into their garments online.
The system we propose here would enable such manufacturers to keep stricter
account of the flow of goods and production materials. This process is closely
related to that of tracking the provenance of contaminated or malfunctioning
goods as depicted in Figure 2. The simplest potential threat is that of incidental
data-corruption, loss, or human-input error. The distributed nature of the data
model, together with a pre-arranged consensus threshold would serve to stem
the adverse effect of this inevitability.
5 Discussion & Conclusion
It has been stated that a “private blockchain” is nothing more than an atypical
name for a shared database. In this work we have demonstrated that this is in
fact the case. However we have also endeavored to provide examples whereby a
shared database with certain properties, under specific assumptions, can solve
useful problems. In assessing the merits of a technology one is never fully correct
(or fully incorrect) to prefer one method over another. In creating this paper we
might have individually type-set each letter, printed it with ink, and scanned the
result into a computer. We chose the more difficult method and used LATEX. In
the modern world businesses are often are burdened with long and convoluted
supply chains. The final determination of the degree to which the data manage-
ment techniques described above are practically useful is empirical. In [1] it is
pointed out that Satoshi was probably not an academic because he implemented
his system first and wrote about it later. This work asserts the plausibility of
that conjecture insofar as the protocol herein described remains to be actualized.
What we have done in this work is to venture a rough framework and design
methodology. Through careful consideration of the processes by which one might
derive concrete value through the actionable properties inherent in the Bitcoin
protocol we seek to solve useful problems for the supply chain management com-
munity.
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